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CSR, Financial Performance and Risk: does it add up for mid-caps? 
WORKING PAPER 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to establish whether there is a link between Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) scores, Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) and risk in US mid-cap 
firms. Whilst much previous work has been carried out on large-cap firms, the mid-cap sector 
has been neglected in academic literature and by the investor/analyst world.  
The CSR scores from a sample of 365 large-cap, 279 mid-cap and 356 small-cap firms from 
the US S&P stock indices were regressed against a range of market-based, accounting-based 
and risk-based variables to assess whether there was any correlation between them.  
Whilst positive findings were made for the large-cap and small-cap firms, there was little 
evidence of any such relationship for mid-cap firms. 
These findings fill a gap in the literature on a much neglected but unique market sector, 
which is of importance to those who work within that sector, in that they may gain a better 
understanding of the implications of their unique environment, but also for investors and 
analysts alike who have hitherto largely ignored the mid-cap sector. 
Keywords: large-caps, mid-caps, small-caps, CSR, CFP, risk.  
Introduction 
Research on the effects of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Financial 
Performance (CFP) are not new. There have been hundreds of studies since the 1970s: some 
have found a positive relationship (for example,(Sturdivant & Ginter 1977; Spicer 1978; 
McGuire et al. 1988; Orlitzky 2001a; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Gama Boaventura et al. 2012; 
Chung & Pyo 2013), some a negative relationship (for example(Chen & Metcalf 1980), some 
a neutral relationship (for example,(Alexander & Buchholz 1978; Aupperle et al. 1985; Pava 
& Krausz 1996; McWilliams & Siegel 2001) and some studies have found a U-shaped 
relationship (for example,(Bowman & Haire 1975; Barnett & Salomon 2012).  
The main two theoretical strands to the CSR-CFP debate are the business case (Friedman 
1970) and stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984). From the business case perspective, CSR 
activities should only be adopted if they increase shareholder wealth, whereas proponents of 
stakeholder theory suggest that the role of business is to attend to the requirements of a 
broader range of stakeholders than only the capital providers. The vast majority of papers 
adopt the business case theory, in that without seeing a financial benefit to investing in 
potentially non-core activity such as CSR, firms would not normally choose to spend money 
or other resource on activities without a financial payback. This is largely because in the 
Western world (and the vast majority of studies are US-based), stock markets reward short 
term actions which drive up financial performance and hence wealth. To divert funds away 
from such activities is regarded as potentially irresponsible (Friedman 1970). Whilst these 
theories principally assume that CSR drives financial performance, there is also a reverse 
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argument which centres on whether or not the relationship is one-way or whether improved 
financial performance is also a pre-requisite to improved CSR performance (reverse 
causality/slack resources theory) (Waddock & Graves 1997). This suggests that firms need to 
have sufficient resources to invest in CSR in the first place, which then result in better 
performance and hence a virtuous circle continues. We will return to this argument later in 
this paper.  
The proponents of the business case suggest that investment in CSR improves financial 
performance and reduces risk, not least because it can improve sales (Waddock & Graves 
1997), but it can also reduce litigation costs and hence risk. As an illustration, by having good 
environmental practices, firms are less likely to pollute the environment and be fined (Spicer 
1978). This can lead to increased share prices, but also a reduction in costs. This cost 
reduction arises due to the lower litigation costs, but also the cost of hiring and retaining 
employees, who are more likely to be attracted to an employer which considers CSR issues 
(McWilliams & Siegel 2001). Reduced costs then lead to increased profits, improving returns 
such as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Detractors of CSR note that CSR 
actually increases costs to implement activities and can detract from the profit-making motive 
(Freeman 1999). Increased stock prices through higher or more reliable (less risky) profits 
will also affect market metrics, such as Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is a ratio of firm market value 
to replacement cost of assets. A low score (between 0 and 1) may indicate that the stock is 
undervalued as the cost to replace a firm's assets is greater than the value of its stock. A high 
score (greater than 1) may indicate that a stock is overvalued since the stock is more 
expensive than the replacement cost of its assets.  
Most previous studies on CSR-CFP focus on large US companies (only the S&P500) using a 
CSR proxy database called KLD (e.g.(Waddock 2003). Whilst such studies note that the 
business case for CSR appears to weaken the smaller firms become, there is no further 
examination of that assertion. This study therefore aims to investigate whether the 
characteristics of firms (such as size as expressed by market capitalisation) has an impact on 
any CSR-CFP relationship in the UK. Market capitalisation is derived from the market price 
of an ordinary share multiplied by the number of shares in issue. It is a measure of size but 
also of market value. It varies over time as both market prices change and shares are issued or 
re-purchased. In order to differentiate between different sizes of firms, stock exchanges and 
analysts divide firms by their market capitalisation into large-cap, mid-cap and small-cap.  
There is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes large-cap, mid-cap or small-
cap (Reckamp 2014). Some analysts use a certain percentage of firms in the stock exchange 
(e.g. large-caps equate to the largest 70% of the market) (Switzer 2010) whilst others use 
financial bands (Reckamp 2014). This banding method may consider large-caps as those 
firms with a market capitalisation of greater than $10 billion, mid-caps as between $2 billion 
and $10 billion and small-caps as those with a market capitalisation of less than $2 billion 
(Mutualfundstore 2015). Clearly, over time, there is movement in firms’ market capitalisation 
which can cause them to move out of one category and into another. This is considered in 
many market indices, such as Standard & Poors (S&P), by regularly reviewing constituents 
of such indices, so that the top 100 firms by market capitalisation constitute the S&P100, and 
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so on. In the US stock market, large-caps are encompassed within the S&P500, mid-caps in 
the S&P400 and small-caps in the S&P600. This broadly equates to large-caps having a 
market cap in excess of $5.36 billion, mid-caps between $1.4 and $5.9 billion and small-caps 
between $400 million and $1.8 billion. 
The mid-cap sector specifically has not been the subject of a study on CSR to date, and 
indeed is ‘often underappreciated by investors and under-followed by analysts’ (Kolefas & 
Scalise 2012). As a sector of businesses it is of interest since mid-caps have consistently 
outperformed large-caps in terms of financial performance since the late 1970s (Goldberg 
2016; Thune 2017; Light 2016), however they are very under-represented by academic 
literature and industry analysis which tend to focus on either the large-caps or small-caps, 
despite generally more impressive and consistent performance (Light 2016; Kolefas & 
Scalise 2012).  
Mid-caps differ from large-caps in two main areas: risk profile and growth potential (Neville 
2010). Whilst large-caps are stable in that they can weather recessions more successfully than 
smaller firms (Mutualfundstore 2015) and have vast resources at their disposal, their size and 
corporate structures can make them slow to react to changes in their environment 
(Morningstar 2015). They also have much more limited scope for substantial growth and 
expansion given their already substantial size. As a result of this stability and large resource 
base, large-caps tend to be lower risk investments and provide more reliable dividends. 
However, mid-caps represent what is often referred to as the ‘sweet spot’ for investors (Light 
2016; Kolefas & Scalise 2012), offering many of the benefits of large-caps without some of 
the volatility of the small-caps. They have ‘seasoned management teams, sophisticated 
information technology, broad distribution channels, strong overall market presence and 
ready access to capital markets’ (Kolefas & Scalise 2012), combined with lower levels of 
bureaucracy which render them more able to react quickly to market changes than large-caps 
(Light 2016). Mid-caps are also often acquired by larger companies as a way to increase 
market share or to gain access to new markets/technology/intellectual property or economies 
of scale.(Thune 2017; Kolefas & Scalise 2012). They do however present greater risk for the 
investor than large-caps, but less volatility than small-caps (Morningstar 2015). During 
economic downturns, investors tend to move to the larger stocks and the number of trades in 
mid-caps falls more than for the large-caps (Naacke & Hirsch 2012). 
Therefore, because of their intrinsically different characteristics, it would be inappropriate to 
extrapolate the results of large-cap US studies on to smaller firms without further research. If 
empirical evidence is to inform management action as to which CSR activities are the most 
appropriate for a mid-cap firm given its resource base relative to a large-cap, it is essential to 
examine CSR and CFP within mid-caps more fully. Therefore, this paper will examine mid-
caps to determine if their characteristics and situation differs with regards to the outcome of 
the CSR/CFP relationship. 
Choice of methodology 
Early CSR-CFP studies focused on either reputational surveys (asking management how they 
believed firms scored on CSR performance) (Moskowitz 1972; Bragdon & Marlin 1972) or 
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content analysis of annual reports for the CSR proxy (Abbott & Monsen 1979; Alexander & 
Buchholz 1978). These approaches have been criticised for not being independent (Mattingly 
& Berman 2006) or challenged as to whether CSR reporting reflects actual activity (Ingram 
& Frazier 1980; Cochran & Wood 1984). During the 1990s, the first independent ratings firm 
emerged called KLD (Kinder Lydenberg and Domini). Designed as a tool to provide non-
financial information on firms to aid investors’ decision-making with regards to socially 
responsible investing, KLD has now become the de-facto standard for gathering CSR data on 
firms independently from the firms themselves (Waddock 2003). Hence most studies now 
adopt a quantitative, rather than qualitative approach. 
Whilst the extensive use of the KLD database has moved the CSR/CFP literature on 
considerably, it also focuses the research on larger US firms, (e.g.(Orlitzky et al. 2003; 
Orlitzky 2011; Cordeiro & Tewari 2014; Capelle-Blancard & Petit 2014) as KLD does not 
cover non-US firms. This has resulted in quite limited knowledge of how the CSR/CFP 
linkage may translate into other international jurisdictions or in smaller firms. There have 
been no studies specifically addressing CSR in mid-cap firms despite their importance to 
world economies as major employers and creators of wealth and returns as noted above 
(Mutualfundstore 2015; Naacke & Hirsch 2012). 
Over recent years, there has been an increase in the number of CSR ratings firms (e.g. Asset4, 
Sustainalytics). The remit for these companies, like that of KLD, is to provide CSR 
information to analysts and investors to allow them to make more informed choices about the 
firms they invest in beyond purely financial data and to support active portfolios in ethical 
investments. These ratings firms also now provide data on an increasingly wide range of 
stock market participants (large and small) where possible. This is the case with the 
Bloomberg Professional, a stock market investor portal, which is the data source for this 
paper.  
The most common quantitative methodology in the literature is performing ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions against either market-based or accounting based financial proxies 
(Griffin & Mahon 1997; Sharfman 1996; Lu & Abeysekera 2014). Whilst early studies (such 
as Moskowitz (1972) and Bragdon and Marlin (1972) used stock market-based proxies for 
the CFP variables, later papers criticised this approach as such variables are open to other 
influences, not just CSR. Hence most studies since have adopted a mixture of both stock 
market and accounting based proxies (Spicer 1978; Cochran & Wood 1984; McGuire et al. 
1988; Attig et al. 2013; Lioui & Sharma 2012; Kang et al. 2010). 
Various previous studies have introduced a number of control variables which may affect the 
relationship between CSR and CFP. These include firm size (Attig et al. 2013; Bansal et al. 
2015; Chang et al. 2014; Kang et al. 2010; Inoue & Lee 2011; Park 2014; Gimenez et al. 
2012; Crisóstomo et al. 2011; Lioui & Sharma 2012; Mio & Fasan 2012), risk (Park 2014; 
Lee et al. 2013; Crisóstomo et al. 2011; Mio & Fasan 2012), industry (Bansal et al. 2015; 
Gregory & Whittaker 2013; Crisóstomo et al. 2011), leverage (Bansal et al. 2015; Chang et 
al. 2014; Kang et al. 2010; Inoue & Lee 2011; Cho et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2013; Crisóstomo et 
al. 2011; Lioui & Sharma 2012; Mio & Fasan 2012), R&D spend (Gregory & Whittaker 
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2013; Lioui & Sharma 2012) and capital intensity (Park 2014) (which is often industry 
specific). Many of these controls have also been adopted in this paper. 
In order to assess performance against a variety of variables, three initial hypotheses were 
tested for large-caps, mid-caps and small-caps in the US S&P indices, based on the literature 
discussed earlier. 
Hypothesis 1:  Firms with higher overall CSR scores (ESG) will exhibit higher market-based 
financial performance as proxied by Tobin’s Q (TOBQ) and excess market returns (EXRET), 
controlling for total assets as a proxy for firm size, earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), 
industry (IND), sales growth (SALESGROW), leverage (DEBTEQY), market volatility 
(HISTBETA) and risk, proxied by Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC). Excess 
returns are included as a variable in the Tobin’s Q iteration to improve the fit of the model, 
but is removed when the dependent variable is excess returns. This hypothesis is described in 
the following equation: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀 = 𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with higher overall CSR scores will exhibit higher accounting based 
financial performance as proxied by return on equity (ROE), controlling for the same 
variables as in hypothesis 1 to give the following equation: 
𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴 − 𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀= 𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with higher overall CSR scores will exhibit a lower risk, as proxied by 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) and market beta (HISTBETA). The control 
variables are the same as in hypotheses 1 and 2, with the appropriate exclusion of the relevant 
variable (WACC or HISTBETA) when they are the dependent variable. This hypothesis 
gives the following equation: 
𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀 − 𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀= 𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Data source: 
A range of data for both CSR and financial proxies has been obtained from the Bloomberg 
Professional database for three US stock market indices: S&P500 (large-cap), S&P400 (mid-
cap) and the S&P600 (small-cap).  
A time period of nine years was selected (2007-2015 inclusive). This represents the longest 
period for which Bloomberg CSR data is reliably available. Data was obtained for the same 
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firms (a cross sectional study) across the nine-year time period (longitudinal study), creating 
a panel dataset. The data was cleansed to remove any firms for which data was not available 
for the whole nine year period. For the large-cap sample, this resulted in a reduction from 505 
firms to 365, for the mid-cap sample from 400 firms to 279 and for the small-cap sample 
from 601 firms to 356. All variables chosen for this paper (whether dependent, 
independent/control) were selected as they were the most popular measures used in the 
literature (Orlitzky 2001b; Kang et al. 2010; Saleh et al. 2011). 
As the data is both on the same firms for the same variables (cross-sectional data) over a nine 
year (2007-2015 inclusive) time period (time-series), the most appropriate choice of 
analytical tools are those which relate to panel data (Arellano 2013). A static linear pooled 
ordinary least squares model has been used.  
Dependent variables 
Market measure: 
- Tobin’s Q (TOBQ): ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of 
the firm's assets, based on (Market Cap + Total Liabilities + Preferred Equity + 
Minority Interests)/Total Assets. 
- Excess returns (EXRET): Investment returns from a security that exceed a 
benchmark or index with a similar level of risk. 
Accounting measures: 
- Return on assets (ROA): percentage based measure of efficiency of asset 
utilisation, based on net income divided by average total assets; 
- Return on equity (ROE): percentage based measure of returns to ordinary 
shareholders, based on net income available to ordinary shareholders divided by 
average total ordinary equity. 
Risk measures: 
- Weighted average cost of capital (WACC): A calculation of a firm's cost of capital 
in which each category of capital is proportionately weighted. 
- Beta: a measure of risk expressed as a firm’s share price volatility relative to the 
market it trades in, measured as the opening and closing firm betas relative to the 
market betas for the period. 
Independent/control variables: 
- CSR score (ESG): Total CSR measure or ESG (Environmental, Social and 
Governance) Disclosure Score: a summarised Bloomberg score of environmental, 
social and governance scores, ranked between 0-100. 
- Total assets (TOTASSET): proxy for firm size; 
- Industry:  variable based on Bloomberg’s Global Industry Classification (GICs); 
- Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT): a measure of the financial performance of 
a firm. 
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- Debt to equity: a measure of financial structure (leverage) of a company, 
measured as total debt/total equity. 
Results and discussion 
The summary statistics for the financial and CSR metrics are shown in table 1 below. Whilst 
the lower-level components of the CSR/ESG scores are not yet fully evaluated in this 
working paper, summary statistics are included for all key variables. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for large-cap, mid-cap and small-cap samples 
 
Note: ENV denotes environmental score, SOC denotes social score, GOV denotes 
governance score (all data from Bloomberg). These three are all subsets of the total CSR 
score, denoted ESG in Bloomberg. This resultant total score is a weighted average of ENV, 
SOC and GOV. 
A number of observations can be made from the data. For example, contrary to prior 
literature, over the nine year time period of this paper, sales growth in mid-caps have been 
generally lower than both large and small-caps. This may well be a reflection as noted earlier 
that in times of recession, traders reduce their exposure to mid-caps, hence depressing share 
prices and reducing the availability of funds for mid-caps to invest in sales growth 
opportunities. In other respects, mid-caps appear to have performed more as expected, in the 
mid-range compared with large-caps and small-caps in metrics such as Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
ROE, beta, WACC and EBIT. 
With regards to the CSR (ESG) data, it appears that there are some firms which have scores 
of zero against their CSR entries. This finding may not be unexpected for some elements, 
such as environmental, given that not all industries warrant specific environmental concerns 
(e.g. financial institutions). However, there are substantial legislation/stock market 
requirements which demand minimum standards of governance, hence the zero scores in 
these areas are perhaps more unexpected. 
Another observation from the CSR data is that environmental scores are lowest for all three 
sample groups – this may be the result of the relative weighting of firms in the sample for 
whom there are fewer environmental regulations. At the other end of the spectrum, all 
samples score generally higher in governance issues, which is perhaps not unexpected for 
listed firms operating under Sarbanes-Oxley rules. 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrices for each of the samples in three panels. There are no 
particular high correlation results which would skew the results unduly, and where there are 
some higher correlations, for example in the case of ROA/ROE, they are not used in the same 
model. 
Large cap TOBQ EXRET ROA ROE HISTBETA WACC TOTASSET EBIT SALESGROW DEBTEQY ESG ENV SOC GOV
Min 0.62 -7.01 -61.82 -183.47 0.15 2.18 334.36 -27,927.00 -83.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 13.03 82.62 46.71 527.88 3.17 18.82 2,187,480.00 78,355.00 4,523.94 24,852.63 76.76 82.17 86.67 85.71
Mean 2.04 0.45 6.68 17.04 1.03 9.02 38,213.19 2,602.40 9.37 108.75 27.52 18.07 22.46 54.08
Std dev 1.20 2.34 7.49 24.10 0.26 2.26 128,274.97 5,626.77 83.39 575.50 15.51 18.89 17.84 12.93
Mid cap
Min 0.53 -11.09 -84.92 -163.82 0.05 0.00 112.04 -5,807.32 -81.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 14.67 10.44 76.06 871.04 2.18 18.02 44,686.70 2,918.60 167.49 21,432.67 59.09 68.22 71.93 76.79
Mean 1.90 0.25 5.89 14.04 1.11 9.51 3,423.80 227.76 7.64 103.52 14.75 3.59 8.40 46.40
Std dev 1.15 1.91 7.84 30.58 0.28 2.39 3,494.40 328.40 18.46 582.51 8.31 8.50 10.03 15.39
Small cap
Min 0.42 -10.16 -61.52 -379.68 -0.02 2.39 19.96 -2,157.00 -81.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 15.43 22.89 88.01 185.84 2.85 26.27 27,421.00 1,684.00 1,436.47 213,151.28 42.64 40.31 59.65 69.64
Mean 1.77 0.29 4.59 7.59 1.14 10.09 1,117.77 63.88 8.84 129.79 9.57 0.64 2.85 36.50
Std dev 1.12 2.45 9.85 21.45 0.30 2.71 1,647.05 131.41 39.33 3,777.85 6.48 3.37 6.14 21.77
CSRFinancial metrics
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Table 2: Correlation matrices – large, mid and small caps
 
The regression results for Tobin’s Q across all three samples are presented in table 3. Overall, 
the findings appear to disagree with many previous studies in that there appears to be a 
significant and very slightly negative correlation between CSR performance and CFP for 
large-caps, however there is no similar finding for mid or small-caps, which does support 
previous studies that any CSR-CFP effect is reduced in smaller firms. There appears to be 
very significant (p<0.01) and positive effects on Tobin’s Q from sales growth, excess returns 
and weighted average cost of capital, which are not surprising given the influence of excess 
returns on market values, however the direction of the relationship between Tobin’s Q and 
WACC might be expected to be negative, rather than positive, given the perception of risk on 
firms with higher WACC. In terms of sales growth, a higher Tobin’s Q might well reflect the 
economic rents expected from previous sales growth performance feeding into future 
expectations. There is a negative but significant (p<0.01) effect of beta on Tobin’s Q, 
suggesting that more volatile firms do see a reduced Tobin’s Q. 
Panel A:
Large cap TOBQ TOTASSET EBIT ROA ROE SALESGROW DEBTEQY HISTBETA ESG EXRET WACC
TOBQ 1
TOTASSET -0.139 1
EBIT -0.039 0.602 1
ROA 0.431 -0.091 0.168 1
ROE 0.236 -0.037 0.168 0.666 1
SALESGROW 0.154 -0.023 -0.007 -0.026 -0.045 1
DEBTEQY -0.009 0.076 0.038 -0.038 0.203 -0.003 1
HISTBETA -0.086 0.120 -0.057 -0.115 -0.152 -0.015 0.007 1
ESG -0.116 0.230 0.311 0.038 0.112 -0.073 0.033 -0.155 1
EXRET 0.139 -0.057 -0.042 0.045 0.039 0.040 -0.004 0.019 -0.109 1
WACC 0.271 -0.252 -0.138 0.235 0.034 0.051 -0.105 0.495 -0.226 0.17117 1
Panel B:
Mid cap TOBQ TOTASSET EBIT ROA ROE SALESGROW DEBTEQY HISTBETA ESG EXRET WACC
TOBQ 1
TOTASSET -0.377 1
EBIT -0.027 0.278 1
ROA 0.510 -0.234 0.367 1
ROE 0.224 -0.097 0.250 0.503 1
SALESGROW 0.139 -0.048 0.151 0.236 0.112 1
DEBTEQY -0.002 0.030 0.021 -0.034 0.208 -0.0030 1
HISTBETA -0.142 0.103 -0.017 -0.155 -0.065 -0.0489 0.018 1
ESG -0.090 0.219 0.118 -0.030 0.028 -0.1130 0.045 0.054 1
EXRET 0.202 -0.124 -0.026 0.113 0.026 0.0984 -0.031 0.007 -0.056 1
WACC 0.166 -0.250 -0.011 0.178 0.065 0.0609 -0.069 0.497 -0.037 0.16462 1
Panel C:
Small cap TOBQ TOTASSET EBIT ROA ROE SALESGROW DEBTEQY HISTBETA ESG EXRET WACC
TOBQ 1
TOTASSET -0.242 1
EBIT -0.021 0.450 1
ROA 0.406 -0.131 0.323 1
ROE 0.278 -0.090 0.349 0.803 1
SALESGROW 0.132 -0.014 0.081 0.223 0.131 1
DEBTEQY -0.015 0.114 -0.027 -0.022 -0.125 0.023 1
HISTBETA -0.195 0.081 -0.060 -0.213 -0.206 -0.017 0.043 1
ESG -0.029 0.213 0.119 0.037 0.052 0.016 0.007 -0.112 1
EXRET 0.152 -0.091 -0.022 0.080 0.062 0.084 -0.012 0.015 -0.114 1
WACC 0.123 -0.334 -0.129 0.070 0.025 0.046 -0.050 0.360 -0.111 0.110 1
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The basic industry variable in all the correlations against which the other sectors are 
compared is Basic Materials, therefore any variations are relative to this sector. From table 3, 
we note a wide variety of effects of different industry sectors on Tobin’s Q outcomes above 
that of basic materials; some negative where there is less regulation required in for example 
environmental areas (e.g. Financial and Utilities sectors) and others positive, such as non-
cyclical Consumer Goods, where greater attention may well be paid to CSR activities due to 
their higher visibility to the final consumer. 
Table 3: Regression results for Tobin’s Q: large, mid and small-cap samples
 
With regards to the effect of CSR on excess returns as shown in table 4 below, there is an 
apparently curious effect. There is a significant and negative effect on excess returns from 
higher CSR scores in both large and small-caps, but no significant effect at all in mid-caps. 
This suggests that higher CSR scores inhibit the generation of excess returns over the average 
of the market, although it is not immediately clear why that might be the case. 
That said, the low R2 for this model suggests that a review of the variables used could 
improve the explanatory power of the regression. 
  
Coefficients :
Estimate Std. Error t-value Estimate Std. Error t-value Estimate Std. Error t-value
(Intercept) 1.631         0.161     10.113    *** 2.125      0.153      13.846    *** 1.927        0.144      13.362    ***
ESG 0.004-         0.001     3.287-      ** 0.000      0.003      0.150      0.005        0.003      1.546      
TOTASSET 0.000         0.000     0.536      0.000-      0.000      12.693-    *** 0.000-        0.000      9.617-      ***
EBIT 0.000         0.000     0.118      0.000      0.000      2.939      ** 0.001        0.000      4.247      ***
SALESGROW 0.002         0.000     7.602      *** 0.005      0.001      4.024      *** 0.003        0.000      6.046      ***
DEBTEQY 0.000         0.000     2.411      * 0.000      0.000      1.255      0.000        0.000      1.486      
HISTBETA 1.018-         0.095     10.738-    *** 0.769-      0.093      8.245-      *** 0.688-        0.073      9.367-      ***
INDCommunications 0.120         0.117     1.030      0.499      0.134      3.713      *** 0.515        0.114      4.504      ***
INDConsumer, Cyclical 0.090         0.100     0.894      0.341      0.097      3.510      *** 0.053        0.097      0.544      
INDConsumer, Non-cyclical 0.428         0.098     4.362      *** 0.397      0.096      4.159      *** 0.368        0.100      3.684      ***
INDDiversified 0.944-         0.366     2.582-      **
INDEnergy 0.350-         0.109     3.206-      ** 0.169      0.120      1.411      0.026        0.125      0.212      
INDFinancial 0.291-         0.107     2.718-      ** 0.038      0.099      0.387      0.006        0.117      0.049      
INDIndustrial 0.010-         0.099     0.098-      0.075      0.091      0.824      0.126        0.097      1.297      
INDTechnology 0.472         0.110     4.293      *** 0.423      0.101      4.196      *** 0.334        0.105      3.172      **
INDUtilities 0.540-         0.119     4.555-      *** 0.276-      0.124      2.220-      * 0.329-        0.158      2.086-      *
EXRET 0.037         0.008     4.544      *** 0.080      0.011      7.409      *** 0.055        0.008      7.194      ***
WACC 0.165         0.011     14.617    *** 0.065      0.011      5.952      *** 0.046        0.008      5.629      ***
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Total Sum of Squares: 4,764              3,313              4,048              
Residual Sum of Squares: 3,672              2,534              3,397              
R-Squared: 0.229              0.235              0.161              
Adj. R-Squared: 0.228              0.234              0.160              
F-statistic: 
 57.1702 on 
17 & 3267 
DF 
47.9148 on 
16 & 2494 
DF
38.2146 on 
16 & 3187 
DF
p-value <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16
Balanced Panel: n=, T=, N= 365                       9                      3,285              279                  9                        2,511              356                    9                        3,204              
Oneway (individual) effect Pooling Model
Tobin's Q
Large cap Mid cap Small cap
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Table 4: Regression results for excess returns: large, mid and small-cap samples 
 
 
Table 5: Regression results for ROE: large, mid and small-cap samples
 
Coefficients :
Estimate Std. Error t-value Estimate Std. Error t-value Estimate Std. Error t-value
(Intercept) 0.812-         0.347     2.340-          * 0.819-      0.284      2.883-           ** 0.072        0.337      0.213          
ESG 0.009-         0.003     3.151-          ** 0.004-      0.005      0.798-           0.038-        0.007      5.515-          ***
TOTASSET 0.000         0.000     0.397          0.000-      0.000      2.351-           * 0.000-        0.000      1.921-          .
EBIT 0.000         0.000     0.097          0.000-      0.000      0.611-           0.000        0.000      0.516          
SALESGROW 0.001         0.000     1.281          0.009      0.002      4.097           *** 0.005        0.001      4.719          ***
DEBTEQY 0.000         0.000     1.035          0.000-      0.000      0.813-           0.000-        0.000      0.228-          
HISTBETA 0.732-         0.204     3.597-          *** 0.303-      0.173      1.754-           . 0.119-        0.172      0.696-          
INDCommunications 0.094         0.251     0.373          0.234-      0.249      0.941-           0.108-        0.267      0.404-          
INDConsumer, Cyclical 0.050-         0.216     0.231-          0.068      0.180      0.381           0.050-        0.228      0.219-          
INDConsumer, Non-cyclical 0.103         0.211     0.490          0.228      0.177      1.289           0.152-        0.233      0.650-          
INDDiversified 0.793-         0.787     1.008-          
INDEnergy 0.350-         0.235     1.488-          0.444-      0.222      2.002-           * 0.630-        0.291      2.165-          *
INDFinancial 0.488         0.230     2.122          * 0.127      0.183      0.692           0.123-        0.272      0.451-          
INDIndustrial 0.155-         0.213     0.726-          0.046-      0.169      0.272-           0.236-        0.227      1.038-          
INDTechnology 0.293-         0.236     1.241-          0.001-      0.187      0.004-           0.346-        0.246      1.406-          
INDUtilities 0.219         0.255     0.858          0.267      0.231      1.156           0.180        0.369      0.488          
WACC 0.247         0.024     10.336        *** 0.156      0.020      7.763           *** 0.090        0.019      4.757          ***
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Total Sum of Squares: 17,925                9,190                    19,224                 
Residual Sum of Squares: 17,017                8,709                    18,560                 
R-Squared: 0.051                   0.052                    0.035                    
Adj. R-Squared: 0.050                   0.052                    0.034                    
F-statistic: 
10.9081 on 16 
& 3268 DF
9.18242 on 15 
& 2495 DF
7.6116 on 15 & 
3188 DF
p-value: <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16
Balanced Panel: n=, T=, N= 365                       9                      3,285                   279                  9                        2,511                    356                    9                        3,204                    
Oneway (individual) effect Pooling Model
Mid cap Small cap
EXCESS RETURNS
Large cap
Coefficients :
Estimate Std. Error t-value Estimate Std. Error t-value Estimate Std. Error t-value
(Intercept) 20.391       3.352     6.083          *** 9.479      4.301      2.204           * 17.598     2.611      6.741          ***
ESG 0.112         0.028     3.980          *** 0.115      0.071      1.610           0.139        0.054      2.577          *
TOTASSET 0.000-         0.000     6.877-          *** 0.001-      0.000      6.239-           *** 0.003-        0.000      13.127-        ***
EBIT 0.001         0.000     11.744        *** 0.026      0.002      13.702        *** 0.073        0.003      25.365        ***
SALESGROW 0.015-         0.005     3.250-          ** 0.095      0.032      3.011           ** 0.046        0.009      5.404          ***
DEBTEQY 0.009         0.001     13.351        *** 0.011      0.001      11.279        *** 0.000-        0.000      4.830-          ***
HISTBETA 17.020-       1.970     8.639-          *** 10.025-    2.615      3.834-           *** 13.258-     1.330      9.968-          ***
INDCommunications 7.371-         2.426     3.038-          ** 3.981      3.764      1.058           1.248-        2.071      0.603-          
INDConsumer, Cyclical 2.588-         2.087     1.240-          5.238      2.720      1.926           . 1.542-        1.763      0.875-          
INDConsumer, Non-cyclical 1.378-         2.038     0.676-          0.645      2.678      0.241           4.058-        1.808      2.244-          *
INDDiversified 9.290-         7.602     1.222-          
INDEnergy 10.420-       2.269     4.592-          *** 1.618-      3.353      0.483-           0.420-        2.256      0.186-          
INDFinancial 5.199-         2.222     2.340-          * 0.068      2.771      0.024           0.717        2.109      0.340          
INDIndustrial 3.045         2.057     1.480          1.029      2.559      0.402           1.168-        1.758      0.665-          
INDTechnology 3.332-         2.283     1.459-          1.999-      2.826      0.707-           2.743-        1.906      1.439-          
INDUtilities 12.011-       2.464     4.875-          *** 2.998-      3.488      0.860-           4.510-        2.858      1.578-          
EXRET 0.294         0.169     1.742          . 0.060      0.303      0.199           0.374        0.137      2.724          **
WACC 1.308         0.235     5.570          *** 1.024      0.307      3.331           *** 0.419        0.147      2.855          **
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Total Sum of Squares: 1,907,800  2,347,700  1,473,200  
Residual Sum of Squares: 1,586,300  1,990,900  1,112,800  
R-Squared: 0.169          0.15199 0.245          
Adj. R-Squared: 0.168          0.15096 0.243          
F-statistic: 
38.9505 on 17 
& 3267 DF
27.9384 on 16 
& 2494 DF
64.5062 on 16 
& 3187 DF
p-value: <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16
Balanced Panel: n=, T=, N= 365                       9                      3,285                   279                  9                        2,511                    356                    9                        3,204                    
Oneway (individual) effect Pooling Model
Small cap
ROE
Large cap Mid cap
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The regression results for one of the accounting based financial performance metrics, Return 
on Equity is presented in table 5. Interestingly, as with the finding for excess returns, there is 
a positive and significant effect from CSR on ROE for large-caps (in common with previous 
studies) and from small-caps (though at a lower level of statistical significance). However, 
there is no finding for mid-caps, where it appears CSR is of no impact on ROE (unlike other 
variables such as total assets, EBIT, sales growth, leverage, beta and WACC). Whilst some 
studies yield very low R-squared results, this model ranges from 15.2% - 24.5%, which 
although not high, does suggest a reasonable level of robustness. 
For brevity, the second regression for accounting-based financial metrics, Return on Assets 
(ROA) is not presented since it showed that CSR had only a very small positive effect on 
ROA in small firms, but only to a statistical significance of p<0.05. There was no statistically 
significant effect in either the large-cap and mid-cap samples.  
The effect of CSR on risk, as proxied by weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is 
expected to be negative and significant; however the results as indicated in table 6 appear to 
suggest that whilst there is indeed a very small negative impact for large-caps, there is no 
such impact for mid or small-caps. This is perhaps because investors in those smaller firms 
are neither as aware or as interested in CSR as a method of mitigating risk, Since larger firms 
tend to attract the attention of institutional shareholders and analysts who regard CSR as 
evidence of good and proactive management, as supported by Sturdivant and Ginter (1977), 
Waddock and Graves (1994) and Gama Boaventura et al. (2012), then it is perhaps quite 
credible that CSR may not be of benefit to smaller firms who have a different investor base. 
Table 6: Regression results for weighted average cost of capital: large, mid and small-cap samples
 
Coefficients :
Estimate Std. Error t-value Estimate Std. Error t-value Estimate Std. Error t-value
(Intercept) 6.334         0.224     28.293        *** 5.819      0.255      22.834        *** 7.279        0.287      25.321        ***
ESG 0.013-         0.002     6.170-          *** 0.005-      0.005      1.089-           0.007        0.006      1.027          
TOTASSET 0.000-         0.000     16.707-        *** 0.000-      0.000      14.212-        *** 0.001-        0.000      19.379-        ***
EBIT 0.000         0.000     4.451          *** 0.001      0.000      4.226           *** 0.001        0.000      3.477          ***
SALESGROW 0.001         0.000     2.870          ** 0.005      0.002      2.417           * 0.002        0.001      2.362          *
DEBTEQY 0.000-         0.000     5.565-          *** 0.000-      0.000      4.090-           *** 0.000-        0.000      1.506-          
HISTBETA 3.419         0.134     25.498        *** 3.772      0.153      24.700        *** 3.000        0.151      19.811        ***
INDCommunications 0.119-         0.181     0.659-          0.078      0.245      0.317           0.158-        0.250      0.631-          
INDConsumer, Cyclical 0.010         0.156     0.067          0.347      0.177      1.958           . 0.137-        0.213      0.644-          
INDConsumer, Non-cyclical 0.620-         0.151     4.096-          *** 0.512-      0.174      2.942-           ** 0.338-        0.218      1.549-          
INDDiversified 0.350-         0.566     0.618-          
INDEnergy 0.007         0.169     0.042          0.540      0.218      2.474           * 0.136        0.272      0.499          
INDFinancial 1.074-         0.165     6.527-          *** 0.538-      0.180      2.986-           ** 1.590-        0.253      6.288-          ***
INDIndustrial 0.161-         0.153     1.053-          0.463      0.166      2.783           ** 0.179        0.212      0.846          
INDTechnology 0.790         0.170     4.657          *** 0.564      0.184      3.067           ** 0.627        0.230      2.727          **
INDUtilities 2.438-         0.179     13.651-        *** 1.335-      0.226      5.916-           *** 2.005-        0.343      5.845-          ***
EXRET 0.128         0.012     10.336        *** 0.151      0.019      7.763           *** 0.078        0.016      4.757          ***
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Total Sum of Squares: 16,817                14,342                 23,556                 
Residual Sum of Squares: 8,811                   8,453                    16,208                 
R-Squared: 0.476                   0.411                    0.312                    
Adj. R-Squared: 0.474                   0.408                    0.310                    
F-statistic: 
 185.605 on 16 
& 3268 DF 
 115.865 on 15 
& 2495 DF 
 96.3513 on 15 
& 3188 DF 
p-value <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16
Balanced Panel: n=, T=, N= 365                       9                      3,285                   279                  9                        2,511                    356                    9                        3,204                    
Oneway (individual) effect Pooling Model
WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL
Large cap Mid cap Small cap
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Another measure of risk is company beta, which is an assessment of the relative volatility of 
the firm versus its general market. Hence beta has been used as another test of risk in this 
paper. Again, we would expect CSR to reduce risk and hence have a negative and significant 
effect on beta; following from the results in table 7, this appears to be true for both large and 
small-caps (although only to a very slight degree), but at a high level of statistical 
significance. There is no such finding for mid-caps – which provokes the question why 
should CSR reduce risk in large and small-caps but not in mid-caps? Is there something 
different in the underlying CSR activities in mid-caps which affects risk, or at least share 
volatility, differently? Indeed, McWilliams and Siegel suggested as long ago as 2001 that the 
interplay of the various elements of CSR contributes to each firm’s differentiation strategy 
and hence competitive advantage. The total CSR score used in this study from Bloomberg 
comprises of three subcomponents: environmental, social and governance. Perhaps therefore 
it is not the absolute score which is important in risk reduction but the specific area in which 
the scores are highest. Further research into the lower level constituents of the CSR score is 
required to ascertain more precisely what the interaction might be. Equally, this further 
research should extend to a greater analysis of the industry effects which clearly also exert a 
significant (and negative) influences in firms of large, mid and small capitalisation. 
Table 7: Regression results for equity beta: large, mid and small-cap samples
 
As mentioned earlier, there is also an academic theory which suggests that the relationship 
between CSR and financial performance is not uni-directional, in that CSR may not impact 
financial performance, but that firms with superior financial performance actually score 
higher CSR because they have the funds/’slack resources’ with which to invest in CSR 
(Ullmann 1985; Waddock & Graves 1997). For this reason, an additional regression was 
Coefficients :
Estimate Std. Error t-value Estimate Std. Error t-value Estimate Std. Error t-value
(Intercept) 0.701         0.027     25.849        *** 0.691      0.030      23.103        *** 0.911        0.031      29.594        ***
ESG 0.001-         0.000     5.148-          *** 0.001-      0.001      0.934-           0.006-        0.001      8.208-          ***
TOTASSET 0.000         0.000     19.862        *** 0.000      0.000      13.054        *** 0.000        0.000      16.177        ***
EBIT 0.000-         0.000     12.065-        *** 0.000-      0.000      5.404-           *** 0.000-        0.000      7.549-          ***
SALESGROW 0.000-         0.000     1.848-          . 0.001-      0.000      3.589-           *** 0.000-        0.000      1.148-          
DEBTEQY 0.000         0.000     2.745          ** 0.000      0.000      3.123           ** 0.000        0.000      1.424          
INDCommunications 0.067-         0.022     3.097-          ** 0.091-      0.029      3.171-           ** 0.180-        0.027      6.576-          ***
INDConsumer, Cyclical 0.066-         0.018     3.579-          *** 0.134-      0.021      6.508-           *** 0.047-        0.023      2.011-          *
INDConsumer, Non-cyclical 0.176-         0.018     9.859-          *** 0.156-      0.020      7.675-           *** 0.267-        0.024      11.293-        ***
INDDiversified 0.145         0.067     2.150          *
INDEnergy 0.124         0.020     6.179          *** 0.084      0.026      3.283           ** 0.141        0.030      4.721          ***
INDFinancial 0.038-         0.020     1.908-          . 0.163-      0.021      7.790-           *** 0.216-        0.028      7.761-          ***
INDIndustrial 0.005-         0.018     0.278-          0.037-      0.020      1.888-           . 0.054-        0.023      2.326-          *
INDTechnology 0.063-         0.020     3.103-          ** 0.111-      0.022      5.139-           *** 0.176-        0.025      7.001-          ***
INDUtilities 0.226-         0.022     10.491-        *** 0.317-      0.026      12.214-        *** 0.427-        0.037      11.436-        ***
EXRET 0.005-         0.001     3.597-          *** 0.004-      0.002      1.754-           . 0.001-        0.002      0.696-          
WACC 0.049         0.002     25.498        *** 0.052      0.002      24.700        *** 0.037        0.002      19.811        ***
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Total Sum of Squares: 228.310             193.140              297.860              
Residual Sum of Squares: 125.100             116.740              197.380              
R-Squared: 0.452                   0.396                    0.337                    
Adj. R-Squared: 0.450                   0.393                    0.336                    
F-statistic: 
 168.503 on 16 
& 3268 DF 
 108.851 on 15 
& 2495 DF 
 108.195 on 15 
& 3188 DF 
p-value <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16
Balanced Panel: n=, T=, N= 365                       9                      3,285                   279                  9                        2,511                    356                    9                        3,204                    
Oneway (individual) effect Pooling Model
Large cap Mid cap Small cap
BETA
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estimated using CSR as the dependent variable and the financial variables as the independent 
variables. The results are produced in table 8 below. 
Generally, the results indicate that higher market-based financial performance (Tobin’s Q and 
excess returns) is actually negatively correlated with CSR in large-caps and for excess returns 
for small-caps, but that there is no statistically significant finding in the mid-cap sample. This 
would suggest that good financial performance in the market may not result in increased CSR 
scores. Interestingly, the R2 in the excess returns regression is reasonable for the large-cap 
sample, but drops significantly for the mid-cap sample which suggests that there are more 
influences on CSR in mid-cap firms than are captured in the current model. 
This anomaly with the mid-cap sample appears again when reviewing the accounting-based 
financial performance metric of ROE. Equally, a higher ROA result does not appear to 
influence CSR scores at all in any of the market company sizes, which was similar when the 
regression was reversed. 
Table 8: Regression results for CSR versus all financial variables: large, mid and small-cap 
samples 
 
 
Regarding the effects of risk on CSR, for large caps, there is a significant (p<0.01) and 
negative effect from both weighted average cost of capital and beta for large caps, and a 
similarly significant and negative effect for small caps for beta, but no findings at all for mid-
Coefficients :
Estimate Std. Error t-value Estimate Std. Error t-value Estimate Std. Error t-value
(Intercept) 53.414       1.897     28.164        *** 17.766    1.200      14.805        *** 13.227     0.854      15.491        ***
TOBQ 0.905-         0.240     3.771-          *** 0.027-      0.176      0.153-           0.101        0.113      0.891          
ROA 0.025-         0.050     0.495-          0.003      0.030      0.089           0.005        0.020      0.258          
ROE 0.056         0.014     3.929          *** 0.009      0.006      1.431           0.012        0.009      1.354          
TOTASSET 0.000         0.000     5.653          *** 0.001      0.000      9.259           *** 0.001        0.000      10.559        ***
EBIT 0.001         0.000     9.514          *** 0.001      0.001      2.511           * 0.001-        0.001      1.073-          
SALESGROW 0.008-         0.003     2.626-          ** 0.051-      0.009      5.721-           *** 0.003        0.003      1.177          
DEBTEQY 0.000-         0.000     0.017-          0.000      0.000      1.470           0.000-        0.000      0.499-          
HISTBETA 6.346-         1.248     5.087-          *** 0.596-      0.755      0.790-           3.286-        0.446      7.366-          ***
INDCommunications 15.720-       1.479     10.628-        *** 3.998-      1.056      3.787-           *** 2.183-        0.683      3.195-          **
INDConsumer, Cyclical 14.359-       1.268     11.329-        *** 2.457-      0.763      3.218-           ** 1.301-        0.580      2.242-          *
INDConsumer, Non-cyclical 14.001-       1.240     11.287-        *** 3.956-      0.750      5.271-           *** 2.430-        0.596      4.076-          ***
INDDiversified 22.522-       4.690     4.802-          ***
INDEnergy 8.085-         1.403     5.764-          *** 3.044-      0.939      3.242-           ** 0.159        0.743      0.214          
INDFinancial 20.923-       1.327     15.763-        *** 5.787-      0.768      7.533-           *** 2.897-        0.693      4.183-          ***
INDIndustrial 12.527-       1.253     9.995-          *** 1.965-      0.717      2.742-           ** 0.609-        0.579      1.052-          
INDTechnology 10.237-       1.406     7.282-          *** 2.562-      0.795      3.221-           ** 2.570-        0.628      4.096-          ***
INDUtilities 9.697-         1.523     6.367-          *** 5.511-      0.974      5.658-           *** 2.626        0.941      2.790          **
EXRET 0.310-         0.105     2.959-          ** 0.067-      0.086      0.776-           0.258-        0.045      5.705-          ***
WACC 0.783-         0.152     5.136-          *** 0.103-      0.088      1.173-           0.038        0.049      0.786          
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Total Sum of Squares: 790,210             173,390              134,300              
Residual Sum of Squares: 606,320             156,340              120,570              
R-Squared: 0.233                   0.098                    0.102                    
Adj. R-Squared: 0.231                   0.098                    0.102                    
F-statistic: 
 52.1195 on 19 
& 3265 DF 
 15.0956 on 18 
& 2492 DF 
 20.1382 on 18 
& 3185 DF 
p-value: <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16
Balanced Panel: n=, T=, N= 365                       9                      3,285                   279                  9                        2,511                    356                    9                        3,204                    
Oneway (individual) effect Pooling Model
Large cap Mid cap Small cap
ESG vs ALL VARIABLES
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caps. This suggests that higher risk companies have lower CSR scores; indicating that 
perhaps higher risk firms regard CSR as unnecessary, or as an investment which will not 
reduce WACC or reduce company volatility. 
One final piece of analysis was conducted to test the theory of McGuire et al. initially 
proposed back in 1988: does financial performance benefit from a higher CSR score from the 
prior year or indeed, does a higher CSR score derive from a previous year’s superior financial 
performance? Firstly CSR was lagged against the independent variables to test whether prior 
good CSR performance would filter through to better performance in a later year. Only one 
year was lagged since any CSR ‘news’ would normally be expected to impact quite quickly 
on financial performance, particularly those variables related to the market. For brevity, the 
detailed regressions are not shown, but the impact of lagging was minimal. In the regressions 
of lagged CSR against Tobin’s Q, excess returns, ROE, ROA and beta), there were no 
significant findings for mid-caps, but all other relationships held as without lagging for large 
and small caps. The only exception was for WACC; prior year’s good CSR performance was 
highly significant (p<0.01) and positive for all sized firms. This suggests that there is some 
acknowledgement in capital providers in all sized firms that previous good CSR performance 
may support the theory of good management ((Sturdivant & Ginter 1977; Waddock & Graves 
1997; Gama Boaventura et al. 2012) and reduce risk and hence lower the cost of capital.  
Secondly, all the financial performance variables were lagged by one year against CSR, to 
test whether there was any indication that good prior financial performance would result in 
better CSR scores as funds are created to invest in additional CSR activities. Again the results 
indicate the same anomaly found throughout much of this paper: there is a statistically 
significant effect on CSR of good performance in the most of the key financial variables from 
prior years (Tobin’s Q, ROE, beta and WACC) for large and small-caps (although the finding 
for ROE did not hold for small-caps, but there is much less evidence supporting a similar 
finding for mid-caps, as only lagged ROE resulted in a positive and moderately significant 
(p<0.05) effect.  
Overall these lagging findings and reverse ‘causality’ regressions for the large-caps and to a 
slightly lesser extent, the small-caps, do tend to support Waddock and Graves’ (1997) and 
Orlitzky et al.’s (2003) concept of the ‘virtuous circle’ of CFP and CSR, in that higher 
performing CSR companies tend to have superior financial results and vice versa and that 
good prior performance does support better future outcomes, irrespective of which came first, 
the CSR or the financial performance.  
 
Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
There is clearly evidence that CSR and financial performance are linked in many ways for 
both and large and small-cap firms which does not appear to be the case for mid-caps. Indeed, 
in many regressions, the R-squared was lower for the mid-cap models, suggesting that there 
are additional variables which would explain the variances in the findings (both financial and 
in the CSR scores) which are not yet adequately captured in the current models. Further 
16 
 
research should be carried out to attempt to determine what these additional explanatory 
variables might be; indeed, as McWilliams and Siegel (2001) asserted, the exploitation of the 
different attributes which make up CSR are intrinsic to the competitive advantage (and hence 
financial success) of the firm. It is perhaps this interplay among the constituents of CSR (such 
as social, environment or governance activities) which manifests itself differently in mid-caps 
in their unique ‘middle-ground’ environment. This environment as stated earlier is less under 
scrutiny from investors and analysts than the large and small-caps (Kolefas & Scalise 2012), 
despite its historic good investor returns. This may mean on the one hand less inherent 
‘necessity’ or pressure from investors to adopt CSR activities (if firms are doing well, there is 
perhaps less incentive to change anything), but equally may mean those firms that do carry 
out such activities do not see the same rewards from doing so than their large or small-sized 
counterparts. For example, more work could be done on analysing the types of investors in 
the different market sectors (institutional versus individual, or levels of insider ownership) to 
determine whether this has a bearing on shareholder expectations to ‘do’ and reward CSR. 
We believe that there is evidence that the mid-cap sector of the market has unique 
characteristics which affect the relationship between CSR and CFP in different ways to large-
caps and small-caps and therefore this paper is of interest to those firms in that centre area of 
the market who may choose to react differently to CSR as a result. Whilst this working paper 
is still in a nascent stage, it seems apparent that the findings thus far are of interest to 
investors, analysts and managers who are interested in CSR and financial performance, but 
also in the unique ‘sweet spot’ (Goldberg 2016; Light 2016; Kolefas & Scalise 2012) that 
mid-caps inhabit and which appears to manifest itself in unexpected ways. 
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